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FOREWORD: SUPREME COURT REVIEW
of exposed flanks which should never have been
pushed so far. Whether the process of rectification
has now been substantially completed and what-
ever high ground remains will henceforth be
vigorously defended, or whether each new test will
be the occasion for further erosion of the protection
of individual rights, will depend partly on the
evolving philosophies of the present members of
the Court, and partly upon the character of the
impending successors.
FIFTH AMENDMENT-IMPEACHMENT
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
On January 7, 1966, Viven Harris was arrested
for selling narcotics to an undercover agent and
taken to an assistant district attorney's office. He
was told of his privilege to remain silent and that
what he said might be used against him. He was not
told of his right to counsel, or that one would be
provided him if he were indigent. Questioning
began and Harris indicated he would like to talk to
a lawyer. The assistant district attorney then
stopped the questioning and notified him of his
right to an attorney. Harris changed his mind and
said he would talk to an attorney the next day. He
was told of the charges against him, and his inter-
rogation resumed.' Harris then admitted that he
had sold narcotics to an undercover agent on
January 4 and 6.2
At trial, Harris denied on direct examination that
he sold any drugs on either date, but testified that
on January 6 he sold two envelopes of baking pow-
der to the agent as heroin. His earlier admission in
the interrogation was introduced to impeach this
testimony. The trial court determined that the full
Miranda warnings had not been given, but ruled
that the statement could be used for impeachment
purposes.' The pertinent portions of the statement
were read to the jury, and the court instructed
them that it went only to the defendant's credibil-
ity, not to proof of guilt. Harris was acquitted by
the jury of the January 4 narcotics sale, but was
convicted for selling heroin on January 6. 4
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction
3-2. The prosecution conceded on appeal that the
1 People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298
N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (1969).
2 Id. at 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
3 Id. Miranda v. Arizona requires that four warnings
be given the suspect before questioning begins: the
right to remain silent; what is said may be used in court
against him; the right to counsel; the right to free coun-
sel if indigent. See 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
4 31 App. Div.2d at 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
warnings given did not satisfy Miranda v. Arizona5
and the deciding justice found that the statement
did not meet the standards of the People v. Kzdis
rule of impeachment, 6 but the majority neverthe-
less held that the use of the statement for impeach-
ment was harmless error.7 The dissenting justices
felt there was some doubt shown by the jury about
the agent's veracity, since they did not find Harris
guilty of the January 4 count, despite the unmis-
takably incriminatory statement. They believed
that there was "'a reasonable possibility'" that
the statement "'might have contributed to the
conviction,'" so it could not be harmless error.'
They concluded,
[I]t is difficult to see how defendant could not have
been damaged severely by use of the inconsistent
statement in a case which, in the final analysis,
pitted his word against the officer's.9
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed per
curiam.10
At issue in the Supreme Court was whether a
' The majority noted that the Miranda violation was
not clearcut, and that had the trial court held a hearing
on the matter, it might well have come out the other
way. Id. at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
6 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873
(1967). The two concurring justices found that Kulis
was satisfied. 31 App. Div. 2d at 830-31, 298 N.Y.S.2d
at 249. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 229 n. 2(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
731 App. Div. 2d at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 248. See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
831 App. Div. 2d at 831-32, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 250,
quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87(1963).
9 31 App. Div. 2d at 831-32, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
10 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71(1969). Chief Judge Fuld, who had joined Judge Keat-
ing's strong dissent in People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318,
323, 221 N.E.2d 541, 542, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875, con-
curred, stating that he was ruled by Kulir, despite his
personal opinion and the large number of courts that
had rejected the Kidis approach. 25 N.Y.2d at 178-79,
250 N.E.2d at 351-52, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
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statement conceded to be inadmissible in the prose-
cution's case in chief because of a Miranda viola-
tion could be used to impeach the defendant's
credibility." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
five-man majority, found that the impeachment
was proper. He first distinguished Miranda on its
facts as applying only to the use of statements in
the prosecution's case in chief:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can
indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an
uncounseled statement for any purpose, but dis-
cussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the
Court's holding and cannot be regarded as con-
trolling.... It does not follow from Miranda
that evidence inadmissible against an accused in
the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all
purposes, provided of course that the trustworth-
iness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. 1'
Without further specifying what "legal standards"
must be satisfied, beyond reference to the fact that
the confession was not claimed by Harris to be
coerced or involuntary," the Chief Justice held
that an exception to the exclusionary rule of
Miranda must be made to counter perjurious testi-
mony by the defendant. Weighing the "valuable
aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility"
provided by the illegally obtained statement
against "the speculative possibility" of police mis-
conduct, he found that "sufficient deterrence flows
when the evidence in question is made unavailable
to the prosecution in its case in chief." 14 Chief Jus-
tice Burger therefore widened the impeachment
"1401 U.S. at 222.
1" Id. at 224. The comments were made by Chief
Justice Warren in discussing the need for a per se ex-
clusionary rule:
No distinction can be drawn between statements
which are direct confessions and statements which
amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an offense.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects
the individual from being compelled to incriminate
himself in any manner; it does not distinguish de-
grees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the
same reason, no distinction may be drawn between
inculpatory statements and statements alleged to
be merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were
in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never
be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements
merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication.
These statements are incriminating in any meaning-
ful sense of the word and may not be used without the
full warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement.
384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
"3 401 U.S. at 224.41 Id. at 225.
exception created by Walder v. United States" for
illegally seized physical evidence to include illegally
obtained confessions, affirming Harris' conviction.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for three of the four
dissenting justices,1 found this extension of Walder
unwarranted. He noted that Walder dealt with
matters entirely collateral to the instant case and
that Justice Frankfurter sharply contrasted the
situation in Walder with one where impeachment
was sought on "the accused's direct testimony on
matters directly related to the case against him." 17
Justice Brennan found the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, as defined in Mi-
randa, to be one of the constitutional safeguards
which leaves the defendant " 'free to deny all the
elements of the case against him,' " s without per-
mitting the prosecution to introduce illegally
secured evidence. He also felt that permitting the
government to use an illegally obtained confession
for impeachment would tend to prevent the de-
fendant from speaking in his own behalf at trial,
thereby "fettering" his choice to speak or remain
silent.19 Relying on Miranda, he rejected the idea
that the statement was any less incriminatory be-
cause it was used for impeachment rather than
introduced as substantive evidence.21 Justice
Brennan concluded that the majority had seriously
undermined the self-incrimination privilege and the
policies behind it specified in Miranda, especially
the policy of "conforming police methods to the
Constitution."21
Harris v. New York is one of the numerous cases
"347 U.S. 62 (1954).
'
6Justices Douglas and Marshall joined Brennan's
dissent. Justice Black dissented separately, without
opinion.
17 401 U.S. at 227-28. See Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925), the case distinguished by Frank-
furter in Walder, 347 U.S. at 66.
10401 U.S. at 229, quoting Wader v. United States,
347 U.S. at 65.
1'401 U.S. at 230. Justice Brennan here referred to
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), guaranteeing the
right "to remain silent unless he [the accused] chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." Id.
at 8. He also cited Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), which prohibits the prosecution from comment-
ing on the fact that the accused did not take the stand.0 401 U.S. at 231. See note 12 supra.
21401 U.S. at 231-32. He found it "monstrous that
courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer"
in any way:
The Court today tells the police that they may
freely interrogate an accused incommunicado and
without counsel and know that although any state-
ment they obtain in violation of Miranda cannot
be used on the State's direct case, it may be intro-
duced if the defendant has the temerity to testify




dealing with the problem of evidence obtained by
the prosecution in violation of the law or constitu-
tional guaranties. After defining the individual's
right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure,22 the Supreme Court developed the exclu-
sionary rule of evidence to preserve that right. The
Court held in Weeks v. United States13 that illegally
seized evidence could not be used at trial against
the person from whom it was seized. The Weeks
exclusionary rule generated impressive dicta, such
as Justice Holmes' classic statement:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
court but that it shall not be used at all. 4
The rule was later extended to evidence obtained
legally, but which was found through the illegally
obtained evidence, under a theory that the illegal
evidence "tainted" the subsequent legal evidence,
so that it became inadmissible "fruit of the poison-
ous tree." 25 The exclusionary rule was made un-
equivocably applicable to the states in Mapp v.
Ohio2 6
The policy behind the exclusionary rule has most
often been described as deterrence of official mis-
conduct,n though the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess and the reliability of the evidence are sometimes
mentioned as alternative reasons for it.2s Such
12 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
232 U.S. 383 (1914).24 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
2 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1940). See Piter, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAsip. L. REv. 579 (1968).
26 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court made a false start
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), by making the
fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable search
and seizure applicable to the states, as part of four-
teenth amendment due process, without also applying
the Weeks rule. This was done in the expectation that
the states would automatically use the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule without being told to do so by the Supreme
Court. 367 U.S. at 650-55.
21 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. at 445-57; Allen, The Exclusionary Rule
in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRBX
L.C. & P.S. 246 (1961); McGarr, The Exclusionary
Rule: An III-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J.
Cani. L. C. & P.S. 266 (1961); Paulsen, Safeguards in
the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. txv. 65(1957); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Ride and Miscon-
duct by the .Police, 52 J. Clm. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961);
Peterson, Restrictions i; the Law of Search and Seizure,
52 Nw. UJ,. REv. 46 (1957).
2sSee, e.g., Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine:
From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 912, 925
(1968); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
justifications for the exclusionary rule have invited
weighing the need for exclusion with countervailing
policies and have produced exceptions. One such
-countervailing policy is the rebuttal of perjurious
testimony, which the Supreme Court relied on in
Walder v. United States to create an exception to
Weeks. In Walder, the defendant had been indicted
in 1950 for possession of narcotics. However, since
the narcotics had been illegally seized, the evidence
was suppressed and the indictment dropped.29 In
1952, the defendant was indicted for new and
different narcotics offenses. On direct examination,
he denied ever dealing with narcotics and repeated
this denial on cross-examination. The government
was permitted to impeach him on the basis of the
suppressed evidence seized in 1950.3 To Justice
Frankfurter, the issue was clear-cut:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot
make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully
obtained. It is quite another to say that the de-
fendant can turn the illegal method by which
evidence in the Government's possession was ob-
tained to his own advantage, and provide himself
with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.
Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would
be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment."1
Justice Frankfurter sharply distinguished Walder
from the situation in Agnello v. United States,n
where illegally seized drugs were the subject of the
charges, in order not to upset the Weeks protection.
In Agnello, if the government could introduce the
drugs during impeachment, to counter the defend-
ant's denial of the charges against him, his right to
testify in his own behalf without being forced to
incriminate himself would be violated. In effect,
the defendant would be "testifying" against him-
self, for as soon as he denied the charges, the gov-
ernment could produce the illegally obtained evi-
dence to impeach his denial. It was not constitu-
tionally permissible there to make any use of the
illegally seized drugs, even for impeachment pur-
poses, because they bore directly on the issue of
guilt. Impeachment on collateral matters in Walder,
on the other hand, was permissible because the
issue of the defendant's guilt was not involved in
his perjurious, volunteered "sweeping claim" never
Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Car. L. RFLv. 939, 946 (1967).
Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,471 (1928)(dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.).
22347 U.S. at 62-63.
30 Id. at 63-64.
31 Id. at 65.
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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to have dealt with narcotics.n Though the evidence
could not be used directly in the earlier case to
establish guilt, it could be used collaterally in an-
other case to impeach his credibility.34 As far as
deterring police misconduct, in the view of one
lower court applying Walder, the government was
penalized enough and the police were sufficiently
curbed by preventing use of the evidence at the
earlier trial.3 5
Walder dealt with tangible evidence, collected in
a previous case, which was irrelevant to the crimi-
nal acts charged in the case at hand. The lower
federal courts, primarily in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, extended the Walder collateral-use
doctrine to confessions before Miranda was de-
cided. In Tate v. United States,3 6 Chief justice
Burger, then Circuit Judge, weighed the exclusion
of a confession because of police misconduct against
the need for truthful testimony.37 Burger found that
the defendant had admitted no criminal act in the
statement, but that he had made a sweeping false
claim about a collateral matter.n The collateral
matter was not of an incriminating nature, so the
confession was admissible. Judge Burger concluded
by agreeing strongly with Justice Frankfurter that
a defendant has no "freedom to 'resort to perjurious
testimony.' " 39
Walder was then extended to confessions of minor
points concerning the criminal acts themselves.
Though a statement bearing on the "central issue
of the case" could not be used for any purpose, 40 a
n 347 U.S. at 65. See Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d
345, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Johnson v. United States,
344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Comment, The Col-
lateral Use Doctrine. From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 912, 919 (1968); Developments in the Law-
Confessions, 79 HAv. L. REv. 935, 1030 (1966).
mT he trial court, Frankfurter noted, had carefully
instructed the jury that the evidence went solely to the
defendant's credibility and had nothing to do with
crimes currently charged. Id. at 64.
35 United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966), reh. denied, 387
U.S. 949 (1967).
36 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960), noted 45 Mnm. L.
Rxv. 669 (1961).
37283 F.2d at 379. Judge Burger based his opinion on
the considerations he had expressed in his dissent to
Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C. Cir.
1959). The confession had been obtained during an il-
legal period of detention. See Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957).
"8 283 F.2d at 380-81. The defendant was charged
with breaking into a hospital and theft. He admitted
coming to the hospital with his accomplice in a car in
the statement. At trial, he claimed he came alone and
did not know the accomplice.
" Id. at 382, quoting Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. at 65.
40 White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C.
confession involving "minor points" could be used
for impeachment.4' Judge Bazelon was careful to
emphasize that such an extension could not infringe
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
if the point were truly minor because "the truth of
the impeaching statement does not itself tend to
establish guilt." 42 judge Lumbard reached a some-
what different result by requiring that the govern-
ment first establish a prima facie case before it
could impeach a defendant's alibi.4'
After Miranda, however, no federal count would
apply the Walder exception to a confession obtained
without the Miranda warnings. The flat prohibi-
tions in Miranda, which made the degree of incrimi-
nation an irrelevant consideration, were held to bar
use of illegal confessions for impeachment as well."
Cir. 1965), approving Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d
542, 546 n. 3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972
(1964) (dissenting opinion of Wright, J.); United States
v. Birrell, 269 F. Supp. 716, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf.
Cannito v. Sigler, 321 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. Neb. 1971).
41 Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1966), approving majority dicta in Bailey v. United
States, 329 F.2d at 543-44. In Bailey, the decision was
complicated by the fact that Judge Miller, for the ma-jority, found there was no Mallory violation, so that his
discussion of Walder was not necessary to the decision,
while Judge Wright, dissenting, found that there was a
Mallory viclation.
42 356 F.2d at 349. The statement involved in Inge
was found by the court to relate too closely to the cen-
tral issue, the defendant's guilt, so the court reversed.
The statement could not be introduced to refresh the
defendant's memory either, since it would have the
same prejudicial effect on the jury. Id. at 350. See also
White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Statement "bore on the central issue of the
case").
43United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 910-11
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966), reh. denied,
387 U.S. 949 (1967).
4United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir.
1968); United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470,
476 (3d Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d
998, 1001 (10th Cir. 1967) (dictum) (Miranda warnings
found properly given); Rolland v. Michigan, 320 F.
Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Utsler v. Erickson, 315
F. Supp. 480,483 (D.S.D. 1970) (harmless error); Hunt
v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 637, 642 (E.D. Va. 1970) (noting
general trend); Flournoy v. Peyton, 297 F. Supp. 727
(W.D. Va. 1969) (assuming without deciding Miranda
overrules Walder). In Brecdlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019
(5th Cir. 1968), cited by Justice Brennan in Harris as
refusing to apply Walder, 401 U.S. at 231 n. 4, the court
found that the statement bore directly on the issue of
guilt and had not been used simply to impeach. The
Fifth Circuit found Walder to be of questionable valid-
ity in light of Miranda, though, in Agius v. United
States, 413 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1969).
This rule was held not to apply to pre-Miranda con-
fessions in Dillon v. United States, 391 F.2d 433, 437(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825, 889 (1968);




In Miranda itself the Court noted, in dictum,45 that
it is often extremely difficult for the jury to separate
direct and collateral evidence, so that what is
strictly unconstitutional in the case in chief ought
to be so for impeachment, 4 the prejudicial effect
being almost the same. Most state courts followed
the federal courts in holding that Miranda had
clearly disapproved the application of the Walder
exception to illegal confessions.47
The New York Court of Appeals held otherwise.
In People v. Kulis,,4 a pre-Afiranda case, the court
laid down a rule that a statement obtained in viola-
tion of Escobedo v. Illinois,49 though inadmissible in
the prosecution's direct case, could be used to im-
peach the defendant's credibility. In its brief per
curiam opinion, the majority relied on decisions by
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Second
Circuit, which had not yet acted to conform to
Miranda,0 to extend the Walder impeachment ex-
41 Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387, 392 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172,
178 (9th Cir. 1968). See note 12 supra.
46392 F.2d at 179. See United States v. Prebish, 290
F. Supp. 268, 273-75 (S.D. Fla. 168); State v. Brewton,
247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943
(1967), noted 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 772 (1967).
47See Velarde v. People, -.Colo-., 466 P.2d 919
(1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1968);
Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969),
cert. denied sub nona. Franklin v. Maryland, 399 U.S.
912 (1970); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174
N.W.2d 79 (1969); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171
S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422
P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967) (Pre-Mi-
randa, but applied Miranda approach anyway); Com-
monwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968)
(harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968);
Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370
(1967) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The fol-
lowing cases, cited for this proposition by Justice Bren-
nan, 401 U.S. at 231 n. 4, were pre-Miranda, decided
on the basis of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964):
People v. Berry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 154, 46 Cal. Rptr.
727 (1965); cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967); People v.
Luna, 37 Il. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967).
The general rule prior to Escobedo also prohibited
the use of incompetent confessions for impeachment.
See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963). See, e.g., Harrold
v. Oklahoma, 169 F.47 (8th Cir. 1909); Kelly v. King,
._..Miss-., 196 So.2d 525 (1967); State v. Tumbow, 67
N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960); Spann v. State, 448
S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. 1969) (admissible in case in
chief as res gestae).
18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873
(1966), noted 13 N.Y.L.F. 146 (1967).
4"378 U.S. 478 (1964).
-o Compare United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1968); Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) with United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1966); Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377
(D.C. Cir. 1960); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp.
798, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
ception to illegally obtained confessions. Judge
Keating, dissenting, found that the then-recent
decision of Miranda made Walder of oestkortble
validity, 51 but the majority ignored Miranda com-
pletely. The court approved extension of the Kulis
rule to Miranda violations in another per curiam
opinion, People v. Harris.-2 The Kulis rule was ac-
cepted by only a few state courts 3 before it was
approved by the Supreme Court in Harris v.
New York.
Interpreting Walder has always been a question
of how far one ought to go in creating an exception
to the Weeks exclusionary rule. 4 The lower court
applications of Walder, prior to Kulis, carefully pre-
served Frankfurter's distinctions as they extended
his exception to illegal confessions. As summarized
by Judge Bazelon, Walder could be used for im-
peachment only with regard to sweeping claims by
the defendant going beyond the crime charged,
lawful acts collateral to the criminal acts with
which the defendant was charged, or minor points
concerning those criminal acts.r5 While it was not
5"18 N.Y.2d at 323-24, 221 N.E.2d at 542-43, 274
N.Y.S.2d at 876. See also United States ex rel. Kulis v.
Mancusi, 272 F. Supp. 261, 264 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 383
F.2d 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 943 (1967).
25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71,
a.ff'g 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969).
See note 10 supra.
5See State v. Ross, 186 Neb. 297, 183 N.W.2d 225(1971); State v..Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262
A.2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249
N.E.2d 818 (1969). State v. Grant, 77 Wash. 2d 47,
459 P.2d 639 (1969), cited by Justice Brennan as fol-
lowing Kulis, 401 U.S. at 231 n. 4, dealt with an Esco-
bedo violation, but made no mention of Escobedo, Mi-
randa, or Kulis. Grant was apparently decided on gen-
eral principles of evidence. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d
478 (1963) (minority rule).
The fourth amendment reads, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
... but upon probable cause....
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1886),
for a discussion of the relation between fourth amend-
ment unreasonable search and seizure and fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination. This case underlies all subse-
quent discussions by the Supreme Court of exclusion of
evidence. But see concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Black, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 493 (1971).
5 Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d at 349. Some com-
mentators have felt that Frankfurter never intended
by the use of the term "elements of the case," 347 U.S.
at 65, to permit the last two categories, introduced in
Tate v. United States and Bailey v. United States.
They argue that Justice Frankfurter, a careful man
with words, would have used the familiar term "ele-
ments of the crime" if he had meant that. See Com-




entirely clear what else an illegally obtained state-
ment could be used to impeach, one thing was quite
certain: the statement could not be used if it were
an admission of guilt. No matter how strong the
policy against perjured testimony was, the de-
fendant "must be free to deny all the elements of
the case against him." 56 Obviously, such a denial
might take the form of the defendant's giving his
own version of the facts, so that to remain free to
deny, he could not be contradicted by illegal evi-
dence on matters relating directly to the issue of
guilt . 7 In the words of Circuit Judge Warren
Burger,
The defendant should not be permitted to commit
profitable perjury with impunity, but he must be
permitted to deny the criminal act charged without
thereby giving leave to the government to intro-
duce by way of rebuttal evidence otherwise inad-
missible. [Citation omitted] Plainly, he is not free
to do this under threat of having an entire written
confession of the crime received against him by
way of rebuttal when he takes the stand and denies
his guilt."
The touchstone for application of the Walder im-
peachment exception was therefore the degree of
prejudice against the defendant's self-incrimination
privilege caused by admitting his illegally obtained
statement into evidence for impeachment. While a
trial court's instructions might or might not
counter possible prejudice,5 9 the fifth amendment
privilege must be protected absent waiver.
Miranda spoke directly to the problems of waiver
of the fifth amendment privilege and the degree of
prejudice against it. For an effective waiver of the
self-incrimination privilege, Miranda abandoned
the voluntariness test announced in Brown v. Mis-
sissippi60 and the totality of the circumstances test
51 347 U.S. at 65.
17 Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d at 166. See
United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470, 476
(3rd Cir. 1968) (post-Miranda); White v. United States,
349 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Tate v. United
States, 283 F.2d at 380.58 Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
This became the majority view the next year in Tate
v. United States, 283 F.2d at 379-80.
5 Compare Breedlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019, 1023
(5th Cir. 1968) (post-Miranda); Lockley v. United
States, 270 F.2d at 920 (dissenting opinion) (Prejudice
cannot be eliminated with admission of guilt) with
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 64 (collateral
matters).
60 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See Comment, The Coerced
Confesssion Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cml.
L. R:Ev. 313 (1963).
used in Escobedo in favor of requiring four straight-
forward warnings to the defendant: the defendant
has a right to remain silent; anything le s,-, cin
and will be used against him at trial; he has a right
to have a lawyer with him; a lawyer will be ap-
pointed for him if he is indigent.6" Only if all four
prerequisites were satisfied would the privilege
against self-incrimination be effectively waived so
that the confession could be used by the prosecu-
tion.6
Regarding the degree of prejudice, the Miranda
Court held that "[t]he privilege against self-incrim-
ination protects the individual from being com-
pelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does
not distinguish degrees of incrimination." 6 Ap-
parently, the Court had determined that the fifth
amendment privilege was not a relative matter,
subject to balancing with other considerations from
time to time, but was an absolute protection which
could not be circumvented absent a strong showing
of intelligent waiver. 64 It was this language which
persuaded most lower courts to deny application of
the Walder exception where a Miranda violation
was involved.
Miranda was by no means a unanimous decision,
however. Justice Clark preferred the Escobedo
totality of the circumstances test,6' while Justices
Harlan, Stewart, and White continued to support
the voluntariness test.66 The sharp division of
opinion over confessions evidenced by the 5-4
Miranda decision invited exceptions to the
Miranda exclusionary rule. To those familiar with
the Walder exception to the Weeks exclusionary
rule, the analogy to the Miranda exclusionary rule
was obvious.67 One commentator even suggested
that the majority's approach actually made Walder
properly applicable to confessions because the ex-
clusion was no longer based on the unreliability of
61384 U.S. at 467-73.61 Id. at 444. The Court refused to make any distinc-
tion between "admissions" and "confessions," also.
Id. at 476.6 3Id. See note 12 supra.64 See 384 U.S. at 475.65 1"d. at 502-03 (concurring and dissenting opinion).66 Id. at 524-26 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.),
at 544-45 (dissenting opinion of White, J.). See Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 492-93 (dissenting opinion
of Harlan, J.), at 493-95 (dissenting opinion of Stewart,
J.), at 495-99 (dissenting opinion of White, J.).
67 See George, The Fruits of Miranda. Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 478,491 (1967);
Pitler, supra note 25, at 630-36; Comment, The Im-
peachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rudes, 34 U.
CoI. L. REv. 939, 950 (1967).
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the evidence, but simply on official misconduct.0
Kulis created just such an exception to Miranda,
as affirmed in People v. Harris.
If Miranda were only intended to deter police
misconduct, the collateral use exception might be
acceptable as a matter of balancing conflicting
policies. The deep dislike for perjury shown by
Chief Justice Burger over the years60 is certainly a
valid factor for consideration. But Miranda was
not simply a matter of prophylaxis-it also ex-
pressed a profound respect for the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. An incriminating
statement could be used only after the strictest
safeguards had been observed, and the word "in-
criminating" was used in its broadest sense. The
change in attitude shown in Miranda with respect
to the right against self-incrimination should have
mandated far greater weight on the side of the de-
fendant than was given in the balancing done in
Harris v. New York. The majority ignored the de-
fendant's fifth amendment rights in its haste to
assure that Miranda. not be "perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of defense." 71
Aside from undermining the privilege against
self-incrimination, there is a far inore serious flaw
in Harris. Harris' admission did not merely speak
of matters collateral to the case, lawful acts col-
lateral to the criminal acts, or minor points, but
rather confessed the criminal acts themselves.n In
short, the Harris majority let the prosecution pre-
sent to the jury an illegally obtained admission of
guilt on impeachment, the very thing Circuit judge
Burger so vehemently opposed in Lockley v. United
States when he stated that no amount of instruc-
tions to the jury can eliminate such prejudice to
the defendant.72 This was also the vice condemned
by the Supreme Court in Agnello v. United States
when it held that the fifth amendment prohibits
incrimination through illegally secured evidence."
cs George, supra note 67, at 491. Professor George felt
that Wakder should not be applied to confessions which
failed the voluntainess test, because they were bound
to be unreliable and so should be absolutely excluded
from the eyes of the jury. A non-coerced confession,
though obtained in violation of Miranda, would be
fairly reliable and could admitted under some circum-
stances for some purposes. Cf. Kent, Miranda v. Ari-
zona-The Use of Inadmiisible Evidence for Impeach-
ment Purposes, 18 W. REs. L. Rav. 1177, 1179-81
(1967); Comment, supra note 33, at 928-29.
61 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
W) 401 U.S. at 226.
71 See id. at 225-26; Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
at 381.
72 270 F.2d at 920.
73269 U.S. at 33-34. See text accompanying note 32
supra.
Unless Agnello can somehow be distinguished by
the fact that the defendant's perjurious answer was
elicited on cross-examination while Harris' answer
was made on direct,74 Harris overrules Agnello sub
silentio. If such a distinction can be made, however,
the defendant now has no way of knowing just what
he can say if he.dares to testify in his own defense.
He can deny the charges but, according to Harris,
he cannot commit perjury. Yet if the defendant
denies the charges but is actually guilty of them, he
has committed perjury. The majority does not sug-
gest an answer to this conundrum. A far better ap-
proach would have been to allow the defendant to
perjure himself on the stand by not letting in the
illegally obtained statement, as was done in the
District of Columbia Circuit, wherever the testi-
mony relates to the issue of guilt.75 In Harris, the
defendant's statement on the stand could well have
been impeached by bringing in a chemical analysis
of the contents of the bags which he admitted on
the stand that he had sold. Miranda prescribes far
more respect for fifth amendment rights than was
shown by the Harris majority in completely disre-
garding the highly incriminatory nature of Harris'
"impeachment."
The key to understanding Harris v. New York is
probably not an examination of the Walder excep-
tion, which does not justify the majority's conclu-
sion, but an examination of Miranda, where Chief
justice Warren and justices Black, Douglas, Bren-
nan and Fortas were the majority. The minority in
Miranda was Justice Clark, who adhered to Esco-
bedo, and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White, who
adhered to the pre-Escobedo voluntariness test.76
The Harris majority consisted of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, White and
Blackmun. In the minority were Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Chief Justice
Burger did not say what "legal standards" must be
met before a confession violating Miranda may be
used for impeachment," but he did note that
"[p]etitioner makes no claim that the statements
made to the police were coerced or involuntary." 71
Harris looks suspiciously like a return to the volun-
tariness test wherever Miranda can be distin-
guished and demonstrates a favorable climate for
74 See 401 U.S. at 223; 269 U.S. at 29-30. Cf. Com-
ment, supra note 33, at 914.
75 Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d at 546 n. 3
(Wright, J., dissenting), approved in White v. United
States, 349 F.2d at 968. See note 41 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
7401 U.S. at 224.
7 Id.
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